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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY: THE COSTS OF CHILDCARE 
This report was commissioned from the Childhood Wellbeing Research 
Centre by the Department of Education in response to public concern about 
the apparent high costs of childcare to parents in the UK.  The Department 
requested a technical analysis of the current comparative literature and data 
on the affordability of childcare to parents. It also requested further analysis 
on the costs to providers of providing childcare; and on the contribution of 
governments in providing subsidies to parents and/or providers.  
The two agreed research questions were: 
1. What is the scope and what are the limitations of the comparative 
literature on the net costs to parents (childcare fees) of using 
childcare? 
 
2. Why are the net costs to parents in the UK so high, given the relatively 
high level of expenditure on Early Childhood Education and Childcare 
(ECEC)? 
 
The main data source for this report is the OECD family database and its 
associated background papers which explain the methodology for compiling 
the information. It is the most rigorous source of information currently 
available. This database is continuously updated and reorganised and 
presents 60 indicators for assessing the range of public policies which support 
the well being of families and children. The database which can be found at 
http://www.oecd.org/els/familiesandchildren/oecdfamilydatabase.htm  is 
designed to be easily accessible for policymakers and others interested in 
comparative information. The tables are clearly enumerated, and this report 
has followed OECD enumeration. 
The indicators most relevant to the research questions are reproduced and 
discussed in this report, but the total picture is complex and inevitably 
contains some contradictions.  
The OECD is intending shortly to present country profiles, which will enable 
direct comparisons between all member countries or groups of countries but 
this facility is not available at the time of writing. The authors have therefore 
supplemented the report by references to some recent European comparative 
data, and to two detailed country studies, Netherlands and Norway. These 
countries were chosen because, as in the UK, the majority of early education 
and care is provided by voluntary and non-state organisations; and because 
they give a picture of the complexities involved in making comparisons.  
Comparative data are contingent on arriving at common definitions of the 
services provided, and presume similar compilation dates. The data from 
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each country represents an approximation from a range of sources, especially 
in federal countries or countries where there is devolved government.  
Comparative data therefore is not raw data, but has been previously selected, 
interpreted and analysed in order to present it in tabular form. These 
constraints in making comparisons are discussed in more detail in the body of 
this report. 
The report concludes that: 
 The provision of early childhood education and care is a complex area 
and not easily comparable across OECD countries. The OECD 
database represents a general indication of comparative position, 
rather than any hard and fast ranking. 
 
 The high gross cost of childcare for parents in the UK given in the 
OECD comparative table on childcare fees is partly an artifice of the 
way in which data is presented. Childcare fees for two year olds in 
centre-based care are compared at the point of use after direct 
provider subsidies are taken into account. Since many countries use 
direct provider subsidies as a means of keeping fees low it is 
problematic to compare these fees directly with countries like the UK 
where subsidies for childcare are instead given to parents through the 
tax and benefit system.  
 
 Tables which show how governments subsidise families with young 
children across a range of taxes and benefits give a more accurate 
reading of the situation concerning the affordability of childcare. The 
UK compares favourably with other countries on social spending for 
children under five but this does not appear to have impacted 
significantly on the childcare fees parents pay. 
 
 Many countries exercise fee capping for childcare and have regulations 
that specify that fee charges must be related to household income, 
generally set at around 15-20% of household income. In the UK, a low 
income lone parent household is estimated to pay approximately 14% 
of household income, but dual earner households receive less 
government support. At 167% of average earnings the childcare fees 
paid by a dual earner household typically amounts to approximately 
43% of household income.  
 
 Those countries which exercise fee capping regulate childcare fees at 
the point of use. In the UK, the evidence suggests that retrospective 
reimbursement through the tax and benefits system has been a 
deterrent for many families.   
 
 The use of supply led systems and fee capping regulation in most 
countries has depressed the growth of the private childcare market, 
and there is more reliance on voluntary, co-operative and state 
provision. By contrast in the UK and countries such as USA, and 
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Australia, parents are reimbursed through the tax and benefit system 
for the childcare they choose to purchase in an open childcare market, 
where fees may be set by providers in order to maximise profitability. 
 
 The UK, comparatively speaking, is a high spender on early childhood 
education and childcare, although its ranking depends to an extent on 
the indicators used.  However, the figures used in the comparative data 
are unable to take into account the exceptionally varied pattern of 
provision and funding in the UK, and in particular the use of the 
informal sector.  
 
 UK expenditure on ECEC is high, but OECD figures suggest that this 
expenditure is not translated into equality of access to childcare or 
early education. Higher income quintile groups benefit 
disproportionately. Lower income quintile groups are least likely to 
access provision. The reasons for this are likely to be complex and 
related to more general fiscal policies on poverty, labour market and 
family well-being, as well as to the particular structure of the UK 
childcare market. 
 
 There are no comparative figures available on how much it costs to 
provide childcare, since there are a wide range of factors which affect 
uptake and type of provision.  
 
 The OECD presents data on the quality of provision as indicated by 
Staff: child ratios and the qualification levels of childcare staff. These 
are generally assumed to be key indicators of quality. Comparative 
data available on ratios, place of work, and the levels of qualifications 
of workers suggest that UK workers in childcare appear to be less well 
qualified than workers in other countries, although those that work in 
schools providing nursery education tend to be better qualified.  
Deregulation in the UK would lead to a reduction in quality, as 
measured by these indicators.  
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2. General Comments on the Data Sources for the Literature 
Review. 
In this section, we highlight some relevant trends and issues in 
considering childcare affordability and costs. We indicate the data 
sources used and the background literature to those data sources.   
2.1. The topicality of ECEC. 
Early Childhood Care and Education (ECEC) is a topical issue, not least 
because of the work of James Heckman, the Nobel prize winning economist, 
who has calculated that returns from investment in the early years brings 
exceptional returns (Cunha and Heckman 2007). Heckman’s claims have 
often been simplified and taken out of context, but they have nevertheless 
inspired considerable debate. In addition, work on gender in the EU and 
OECD has led to a great deal of interest in the reconciliation of work and 
family life, and the role that ECEC has to contribute to it. This is discussed 
more fully in a number of EU and OECD documents (NESSE/EU 2009; 
Plantega and Remery 2009: EU 2011, OECD Starting Strong 2006; OECD 
Babies and Bosses series 2002-8). As a result many countries, including the 
UK, have considerably reviewed and revised their ECEC policies over the last 
10 years. The comparative tables discussed here have to be read against this 
background of change and development in ECEC services. Although the 
OECD commentary on each table was updated in 2011 it should be noted that 
some of the data collection was first undertaken in 2001.      
2.2. Typologies of Care and Education 
The organisation and pattern, as well as the uptake, of early education and 
care differ considerably across countries. The distinction between “childcare” 
and “early education” has different parameters in different countries. 
Comparative data in this field invariably requires compromises over definitions 
and over the validity and reliability of data. 
Categories which may be meaningful in one country are not understood in 
another and many countries have categories of provider, which are not used 
outside of that country. Informal care arrangements in particular have proved 
very difficult to classify and track.  
As an example of the non-transferability of categories, in Norway there are 
more than 30 categories of provider listed, which include distinctions between 
different kinds of ownership – parent co-operative; joint stock company etc 
(See Appendix 2). In other countries categories of provider may distinguish 
between different kinds of religious provider – as in Germany (see Penn 
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2012). Similarly in the UK, there are historically complex patterns of provision 
spanning education, childcare and welfare, and some of the definitions in 
common use are not shared outside of the UK (Scheiwe and Willekens 2009). 
There may be some confusion, for example, over the category “early 
education” if it is not provision within the formal education system, and words 
like “setting” and “playgroup” are not generically used.  
The OECD provides an extensive comparative database to compare how 
countries use fiscal policy to support family wellbeing across a wide range of 
indicators. Since early childhood care and education (ECEC) is very 
heterogeneous, the OECD has attempted to provide a typology of services, to 
ensure issues of comparability can be addressed. The typology gives the 
categorisations used by OECD for ECEC and illustrates the range of variation 
in hours available, ages catered for, and types of service provided across 
countries.   (See appendix 3 OECD Family database PF4.1A) 
As far as possible the comparative tables given by the OECD attempt to 
compare like with like, and are matched for hours attended, ages of children 
attending, and type of service, but this is not always possible and some 
approximations are necessary. The comparative tables attempts to take into 
account childcare and education, and their overlaps. Comparative tables 
which deal with family expenditure are usually presented as percentages of 
median or other specified income level.  
2.3. Country-wide data in devolved governments 
It should also be stressed that the comparative tables mostly refer to country-
wide data, even though many countries have federal or devolved 
administration. In federal countries one state or region may be taken to 
represent the country as the comparator- for instance the state of Michigan for 
much of the USA data. The UK is referred to as a country in the comparative 
data, even although there is devolved administration, and much of the in-
country data available may only refer to England.  
2.4. Scope of data discussed in this report. 
As pointed out, ECEC presents a complex picture, and many factors affect the 
uptake and profiles of ECEC services. The remit for this report did not include 
the wider demographic factors, work-family reconciliation policies, and 
parental leave entitlements, although they may well be important in 
determining uptake of childcare and affect maternal employment levels. 
Instead the report focuses on the nature of registered centre-based childcare 
pricing and costs, and on childcare affordability as determined by the extent 
and types of the financial subsidies offered to parents to offset costs.  
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2.5. UK data sources. 
The report considers the UK data sources which profile childcare affordability 
and childcare costs. There are a number of relatively recent reports and 
papers which illustrate the complexity of ECEC in the UK and the difficulties in 
coming to conclusions about what parents pay for childcare and how they are 
subsidised. This in turn affects how information from the UK is submitted to 
the OECD for comparative purposes. This is discussed in more detail in the 
next section.     
2.6. Background literature to the OECD Family database  
The OECD in 2005 issued a comprehensive comparative report on childcare 
costs where methodological issues are exhaustively discussed. (OECD/EU 
Can Parents Afford to Work? Childcare Costs, Tax-Benefit Policies and Work 
Incentives: Immervoll and Barber 2005).  This discusses the statistical and 
measurement issues that arise in providing comparative data on ECEC. This 
includes the rationales for selecting the comparative figures on childcare fees 
for two year olds in centre based care, namely after institutional subsidies but 
before tax and benefit subsidies. The authors consider this point of 
comparison the one most likely to present an accurate figure, since most 
countries offer such subsidies, and the use of the tax and benefit figures 
introduces an extra layer of complexity into the calculations. They point out 
however, that the picture of ECEC is a complex one, and has to take into 
account a range of fiscal policies which affect demand for childcare, as well 
more general demographic and labour market characteristics of the 
population. Immervoll and Barber stress this complexity and the difficulties of 
working with incomplete data: 
The observed country differences (on childcare costs) are a reflection 
of both incomplete information on childcare use (notably a lack of 
consistent data on the use of informal care across countries) and the 
large number of factors influencing childcare arrangements. These 
factors include demographic and labour market characteristics as well 
as institutional factors such as childcare affordability, tax-benefit 
systems as well as other aspects of work/family reconciliation policies 
such as workplace practices and the nature of parental leave 
entitlements (2005: para .17) 
Since the Immervoll and Barber paper was published, the influential 
Stiglitz/Sen/Fitoussi report The Measurement of Economic Performance and 
Social Progress (2009) has stressed the importance of a wide range of micro-
financial data - household level information in understanding and predicting 
outcomes across a range of indicators. As a result, the OECD Family 
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Database Series has expanded its range to include data concerning aspects 
of ECEC usage, ECEC costs and the relationship of ECEC policy to 
employment and income distribution, which postdate the Immervoll and 
Barber paper. Each of these comparative indicators contains a short 
description of the methodology involved in compiling the table. This database 
is continuously updated.   
A new OECD paper “Money or Kindergartens” has been published which 
discusses ECEC fiscal policy (Forster and Verbist 2012). It follows on from 
earlier work by the authors analysing the EU SILC data  Income and living 
conditions in Europe (Eds A. Atkinson and E.Marlier  2012 ) and extends this 
across the OECD.  It suggests that the direct funding and provision of ECEC 
services can be a useful tool in poverty reduction and more equitable take-up 
of services, although direct cash benefits may also be used to reduce child 
poverty.   
2.7. Relevant EU data and other international literature 
There is no reliable comparative data on costs of childcare to parents other 
than the OECD data, and as indicated, some of this data is over 10 years old.  
The OECD data on family income and expenditure draws heavily on EU data, 
in particular the EU SILC household survey data (Eds A. Atkinson and E. 
Marlier 2012). Some papers are published jointly between OECD and EU. In 
addition the EU has recently published its second report on Social Services of 
General Interest, which explores the regulatory profiles of 22 European 
countries on a variety of issues including childcare (European Commission 
2012, Second Biennial Report on Social Services of General Interest).  A 
separate article, drawing on the childcare data collected for the Biennial report 
outlines regulatory requirements for childcare in Europe (Penn 2012).  
Information about financial regulation and fee capping across Europe is 
discussed in this article. 
The authors of this report have previously commissioned studies of the 
operation of the childcare market in a number of countries for a recent book 
Childcare Markets: Can They Provide an Equitable Service (Lloyd and Penn 
2012). Extracts from the chapter about Norway are reproduced in Appendix 2. 
Additional information from ongoing work by Lloyd (see Lloyd and Penn 2010) 
on the Netherlands is also included in appendix 1. These two countries are 
presented as appendices to the report, to illustrate the complexities in making 
detailed comparisons between countries. 
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3. UK Databases on Fee Charges and Costs of Childcare 
In this section we consider some of the information from UK databases 
about childcare affordability and costs, in order to illustrate the 
complexities which OECD databases could not fully accommodate. 
3.1. Heterogeneity of childcare and education arrangements in the UK 
The UK has considerable heterogeneity of childcare arrangements in 
comparison with other countries, where, especially in Europe, provision tends 
to be more standardised (Scheiwe and Willekens 2009). Historically in the UK 
there have been three strands of provision, childcare, welfare, and early 
education, which, under different governments, have been differently 
administered and costed. The current position is that there are many kinds of 
childcare, offered at varying prices, with different cost packages, and with a 
variety of providers, and patterns of usage tend to be complex. There is also a 
complex interface with early education, which is free to parents at the point of 
use, but is increasingly provided within childcare rather than within education 
services until children start school. The Government’s implementation of a  
right to September entry to reception classes in  maintained schools for four 
year olds has  also  extended  school-based  education for some children.  
A particular feature of the UK is that it relies heavily on the for-profit private 
market to deliver childcare, and early education for children from two years. 
The UK government has adopted a system of demand led funding for 
childcare through the tax and benefit system, (in contrast to supply side 
funding for part-time free early education places), in order to support parental 
choice in an open childcare market. This demand led childcare funding is 
unusual within Europe, but less so in other English speaking countries, most 
notably the USA and Australia, where the private for-profit market is also 
prominent. There is some suggestion that government subsidies to parents to 
enable them to buy childcare in the market has resulted in higher fees (Press 
and Woodrow 2009, Lloyd and Penn 2012). The most recent provider survey 
in England by Brind et al (2012) suggests that on average the annual profit 
per childcare nursery is £13,600 but that this varies considerably with the size 
of the nursery and the location. This report also found that one in 10 (11%) 
group based providers had broken even and around a quarter (24%) had 
made a loss. The loss-makers tended disproportionately to be small nurseries 
in deprived areas. At the top end of the market some large chains were 
dealing with revenues of up to £80 million pa and made pre-tax profits of up to 
£3.5 million p.a, (Laing and Buisson 2012). These are relatively slight margins 
for big companies. Five years ago, estimated profit margins were much 
higher., but the market has consolidated (Blackburn 2012).  
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3.2. Calculating the fees parents pay for childcare  
Because of the range of childcare providers, the heterogeneity of childcare 
arrangements, and demand led funding it is generally difficult to track the link 
between the subsidies offered to parents to offset childcare, and the providers 
who are selected by parents in the private childcare market (Lloyd and Penn 
2012).  This has been done indirectly in the UK through provider and parent 
surveys of costs and take-up rates. Outside the UK, where provision is more 
homogeneous, and daily and weekly usage is more regular, it is easier to 
calculate costs, and fees and expenditure are more likely to be definitively 
known (Plantega and Remery 2009). There is inevitably a time-lapse between 
the point at which data is collected, and the publication of reports which refer 
to the data.  
There are four main sources of information about fees in the UK: the 
Childcare and Early Years Providers Survey, commissioned by the DfE and 
based on telephone interview questionnaires to an officer in charge or similar 
within the provision (DfE 2011); the Daycare Trust annual childcare costs  
survey which draws information from Local Authority based Family 
Information Services (Daycare Trust 2012); the Childcare and Early Years 
Survey of Parents, commissioned by the DfE; and the Laing and Buisson 
Market Research Company who specialise in information about the nursery 
market, and who undertake an annual direct sampling of subscribers (Laing 
and Buisson 2011/2012).  There are discrepancies between these sources, 
which may be definitional (e.g. definitions of provider type e.g. voluntary or 
private, definitions of profitability etc) and/or may be due to the sampling 
methods used. However the same trends are evident across all four surveys. 
For the last few years fees have risen above the price of inflation, at about 
5%, but the most recent survey (Brind et al 2012) indicates that many 
providers have frozen fees and since the recession they have stabilised. 
The DfE survey suggested that most providers varied their fees according to 
the age of the child, the time attended, and in some few instances for a 
second child.  The fees charged varied considerably by area and providers in 
more wealthy areas charged more than providers in poorer areas.  For-profit 
providers charged on average 13% more than non-profit providers (DfE 
2011). 
The Daycare Trust survey drew on information from Local Authority Family 
Information Services (FIS), who are legally required to collect information 
about fees. However FIS data is inconsistent, since the information on pricing 
structures from respondents is often not directly comparable, given the range 
of cost structures in use by providers. Fees charged by providers are entirely 
discretionary (and sometimes information is withheld). As an example, 
according to the information supplied in handouts by one local authority the 
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fees varied from £160 per week to £500 per week, from a poor part of the 
borough to a wealthier one. A number of nurseries within the local authority 
did not submit any details, and of those that did, many of the prices were not 
comparable because of differences in opening hours, age-banding and so on 
(Southwark FIS 2012).   
All four surveys suggest that fees are location sensitive even across small 
areas. Overall there is considerable variation in fee charges across the UK, 
with charges in London and the South East being consistently higher than 
elsewhere. 
The interface of childcare and education is a further complication in the 
calculation of fees. The Government’s recent decision to extend 15 hours free 
nursery education provision for English two year olds from low income 
families, to extend the nursery education offer to 15 hours for three and four 
year olds, and to continue enabling childcare providers as well as educational 
establishments to offer such places (DFE and DH, 2011), has led to 
considerable debate over access and fees. For-profit providers are less likely 
to operate in poor areas, and those that do tend to be of lower quality (Ofsted 
2008, 2010), which limits access for those for whom the policy is designed. 
Low income parents are less likely to use private provision (Vincent 2011, 
Speight et al  2010a, Speight et al 2010b).  State nursery schooling begins at 
3 and school at 4 (see section 3.1 above), so parents need to decide at what 
point they are going to change from one kind of provision to another.  
The Public Accounts  Committee (2012) held a session to discuss the 2012 
NAO (NAO 2012) report on value for money derived from the Free Entitlement 
to Education for 3 and 4 year olds. They adversely commented on evidence 
that some providers are demanding top-up fees from parents.  
It should be noted then, that information about the fees parents pay for 
childcare in the UK comes from a variety of sources, and reflects a variety of 
situations, so that arriving at a composite figure is problematic.  
3.3. Calculating the subsidies parents receive. 
All tax credits, subsidies and benefits are currently under review by the 
Government, with the aim of simplifying and streamlining them. The Institute 
of Fiscal Studies (IFS) have issued a number of papers on the impact of the 
tax and benefit system on family income and the payment of childcare fees. 
IFS have modelled how changes might affect different income groups (Brewer 
and Joyce 2010) and family income more generally (Browne 2012). This 
report has drawn on IFS papers in order to try to track the presentation of UK 
data in the OECD family database.   
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Brewer (2009) argues that working tax credits have been inefficient, and 
difficult to track because they are retrospective and refer to many different 
kinds of arrangements. A recent HMRC report (HMRC 2011) suggests that 
20% of families in work (55,000 families) do not claim the childcare tax credit 
to which they are entitled, and a further 1.2million families with young children 
do not claim credits at all for a variety of reasons. There is also a high 
turnover of maternal employment in the UK, partly to do with difficulties over 
work-family reconciliation. 1 in 8 families with young children change their 
working arrangements every year, so there are continual adjustments 
necessary to the levels of credit and benefits, and there are time-lags involved 
in making claims which present difficulties for low-income families. But the 
issue is not just one of employment. The circumstances of families with young 
children continually and inevitably change, as children get older, and the 
challenge for policy is to allow for sufficient flexibility to meet these changing 
circumstances and needs.    
Laing and Buisson (2011/2012), who issue specialised economic reports for 
private investors, suggest that parents pay approximately 60% of total fee 
income in the private day nursery sector. This figure is derived from the 
company’s own market survey information. It is not possible to tally this with 
current Government expenditure estimates, as comparable official information 
is not available. 
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Figure 1:  Funding of UK children’s nursery market by sector 2010. 
Laing and Buisson 
 
3.4. Calculating the costs in delivering ECEC provision in the UK 
Brewer (2009) has attempted to analyse expenditure on different types of 
childcare and early education. He has used figures for the free education 
entitlement (excluding 4 year olds in reception classes), and the childcare 
element of the working tax credit to arrive at a figure (in 2009) of £4.2.-4.4. 
billion. This figure excludes other sources of support for ECEC, for instance 
various kinds of training subsidies and regulatory costs. Brewer then models 
the costs of quality improvements to ECEC services, an estimated £2.6billion 
p.a. He discusses how these costs might be shared by parents across 
population quintiles and by the government, under a variety of cost models. 
These models essentially assume the status quo in terms of the range of 
providers, and demand led mode of funding, but they present alternative 
funding scenarios, all of which assume that more money will need to be 
pumped into ECEC services to raise quality, as measured in terms of staffing 
qualifications. The difference between the models Brewer puts forward is in 
the extent to which parents themselves will have to pay extra to cover any 
increased costs. 
The private for profit market nursery sector has provided its own data 
concerning uptake and costs. The figures in figure 2 present estimates of the 
value of the sector within the economy. The value of sole traders (owners of 
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five or fewer nurseries) and of companies, is compared against public and 
voluntary sector provision. 
Figure 2. Value of the UK Children’s Nursery Market by supply sector 
20101 Laing and Buisson. 
 
 
In the last 3 years there has been a 15% turnover rate in for-profit childcare, 
with a further third of all providers now saying that their business is currently 
in difficulties.  Market volatility means that it is harder to track users and 
providers. Business viability is stronger in wealthier areas, but fees also tend 
to be more expensive in such areas (Laing and Buisson, 2011).  
Further work on costs incurred by centre based providers has been presented 
by Brind et al (2012). They suggested that 77% of costs were staff costs, 7% 
were rent or mortgage repayments, 7% were materials including food costs, 
and the remainder of the costs were for administration, loan repayments, 
insurance etc. Generally economies of scale made a difference, and larger 
nurseries were more profitable than smaller enterprises.  
                                                          
1
 This table represents an estimate of income generated by different supply sectors. It should 
be noted that DFE providers survey (2012) gives a figure of 60% of providers in the for-profit 
sector. 
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Education costs, as well as childcare costs, are varied. The recent NAO 
report, mentioned in section 3.2. above, has indicated that English 
expenditure on nursery education is notional rather than actual, since the 
early years element of the Dedicated Schools Grant is not ring fenced. 
Section 2 of the NAO report confirms that take-up rates vary considerably 
(NAO 2010). The money is given to local authorities, but patterns of provision 
differ greatly within local authorities, and within rich and poor areas in local 
authorities. The details of the NAO report were investigated by the House of 
Commons Public Accounts Committee, which identified shortcomings in the 
figures (House of Commons 2012) 
 
3.5. OECD use of UK figures 
Very broadly UK expenditure on ECEC has been calculated on the basis of 
the early education entitlement and from the working tax credit. In both cases 
this data is complex, as highlighted above, and these complexities cannot be 
fully represented in the comparative tables. It is not fully clear how the OECD 
has derived its figures on UK expenditure in the comparative tables, but given 
the typology listed above, it is likely to include figures for nursery education, 
and an additional estimate for four year olds in reception classes. 
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4. Childcare Fees in Comparative Perspective 
In this section we explore the OECD data on fees and childcare 
affordability. We highlight the ways in which fees have been calculated 
and note the ranking of the UK on the comparative databases. 
4.1. General considerations 
It should be noted that the figures given for each country are subject to the 
same constraints as other data, and may vary not only by country but by the 
type of care provided and frequently by region/municipality. In particular 
federal countries such as Canada, Australia and Spain may have distinct 
policies and practices across provinces. The comparative fee data given in 
the OECD Family Database was originally collected in 2001, although the 
data is reused and recombined in subsequent publications. Fees are 
expressed as a percentage of the average wage, so unless there have been 
major changes in income distribution or in ECEC policy, comparative rankings 
are likely to stay the same over time. However, as indicated above, many 
countries have changed their ECEC policies over the last 10 years.  The 
Netherlands (see Appendix 1) is an example of a country which has 
introduced –and revoked – substantial policy change over this period. UK 
policies on ECEC have also changed considerably over the last 10 years 
(OECD Doing Better for Families Country Report 2010) 
4.2. The OECD tables on childcare fees. 
The OECD family database includes a set of tables, PF3.4, on comparative 
fees for childcare. These tables were based on data collected in 2001, and 
were first tabulated in 2004. The commentaries were updated in 2010, and 
some of the data was retabulated.  (There is also a related table in the OECD- 
UK report “Doing Better for Families” which draws on the same data sets, but 
presents the material slightly differently).  
The first comparative table presents gross fees as a percentage of average 
wage, that is the amount charged in each country at the point of use for 40 
hours care for a two year old in accredited centre based care.  It should be 
noted that neither this table, nor any of the subsequent ones reflect supply 
side funding, that is the amount of money given to the centre in order to 
enable it to reduce the cost to parents at the point of contact. Such direct 
supply side subsidies are a major reason for low fees at the point of use in 
many of the countries listed in the tables. In this table, UK fees appear high at 
10% higher than the OECD average. 
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OECD Family database PF3.4.A. Average childcare fees for a two year old 
attending accredited early-years care and education services in 2004 as a 
percentage of average wage.  
 
Subsequent tables in the series present net costs, modelled on three 
scenarios: an average family net income; a dual earner family where one 
partner earns an average wage, and the second partner earns 67% of 
average wage; and a lone parent household earning 67% of average wage.  
Net childcare costs as defined here include fees at the point of use minus 
cash benefits, rebates and tax concessions. Subtracting the latter from the 
gross fee charged by the childcare provider gives the net cost to parents, i.e. 
the “out-of-pocket” expenses resulting from the use of a formal childcare 
facility. Calculations of net childcare cost relate to full-time (ie 40 hours) care 
for two children aged 2 and 3 in a typical childcare facility.  
The following table, compiled in 2004, and which is frequently cited, calculates 
“typical” fees as a percentage of an average family income (Immervoll and 
Barber 2005). In this table UK costs appear to the highest amongst OECD 
countries, around 33% of family net income. These net costs suggest that the 
tax and benefit system has had relatively little impact. For an ordinary family 
in the UK, childcare costs are extremely high. 
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OECD Family Database PF3.4B. Panel B. Net childcare costs for a 2 year 
old and 3 year old as a percentage of average family net income 
 
 
The third table, given below, shows childcare fees as a percentage of the 
family income of a dual family household, earning 167% of average wage. In 
this table tax and benefit offsets are shown. The hyphenated red line shows 
the net costs of childcare to families when these are taken into account. This 
indicates that, dual earner households where the combined income amounts 
to 167% of an average wage pay a very high percentage of their income, 
around 43% on childcare costs, even where tax and benefit support is given. 
In other words the amount of offset is minimal for this category of earners, and 
may constitute a disincentive to work.  
 
OECD Family Database PF3.4 
. 
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The fourth table concern lone parent households. It shows the percentage 
paid in childcare fees by a low income lone parent household on 67% of 
average wage.  In this case lone parent households pay very slightly above 
the OECD average, but percentage costs are considerably less than those of 
higher earning households. 
OECD Family Database PF3.4C. Panel A. Net childcare costs for a sole parent 
family with full-time earnings at 67% of the average wage showing net costs  
 
 
 
This table demonstrates that lone parent households have received generous 
support in the form of childcare fees and benefits, so that for this group the 
costs of childcare have been reduced to 10% of average wage, just marginally 
above the OECD average. Since the number of lone parents in the UK, 
comparatively, is very high at 19% of all families, it is necessary to allocate 
more financial support to them than in other countries; on the other hand lone 
parents are typically low wage earners, and relatively little support has a 
bigger impact than on other types of family.     
Overall the set of comparative tables presented in PF3.4.suggest that gross 
fees in the UK are high, and levels of reimbursement through the tax and 
benefit system in the UK are relatively low except for lone parents, so that net 
childcare costs remain high. The low fees in other countries are not because 
there are particular features of childcare in the UK such as over-generous 
ratios or other regulatory issues which have resulted in higher fees (explored 
in section 4.5. of this report) but because subsidies in other countries are 
supply led. Most countries fund nurseries directly, so as the tables show, they 
offer lower fees to parents at the point of use. In the UK there is a demand led 
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system whereby parents must pay the full cost of care at the point of use, but 
are partly reimbursed through the tax and benefit system. These 
reimbursements have compensated lone parent households, but far less so 
for other households. In those other countries where there are also demand 
led systems, such as US, Australia and New Zealand, fees are high, but the 
degree of compensation through the tax and benefit system is higher than in 
the UK. 
 
4.3. Employer Related Benefits 
The UK has provided employer related benefits through subsidy of workplace 
nursery provision and voucher schemes for parents using childcare, for which 
employers have received tax relief.  A proportion of the costs of the voucher 
scheme are met by employers, and the rest met by parents through salary 
sacrifice.  17% of employers have adopted voucher schemes, but the 
evidence suggests that although advertised to parents as an employer benefit, 
the take-up has been less than expected (Laing and Buisson 2011).  In the 
Netherlands employer support is compulsory and 41% of employers offer 
some kind of childcare support (see also Annex 1) In Latvia 22% of employers 
offer childcare support, but in all other countries less than 10% of employers 
do. 
OECD Family Database PF3.1A  Employers’ provision of childcare/other 
domestic support 
 
 
4.4. Informal Childcare Arrangements 
For a number of reasons, including high costs at the point of use and 
inadequate coverage and quality in poorer areas, informal care is widely used 
in the UK, (Rutter and Evans 2012). Usage is above the European average. 
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However, fee calculations do not usually include informal care, because the 
data is very variable and unreliable. The highest usage of informal care for 
very young children appears to be in accession countries, where state support 
for under twos was heavily reduced after 1990, and in the Netherlands, where 
it was directly subsidised by the Government. 
OECD Family database PF3.3A  Use of Informal Childcare Arrangements 
by children’s age during a typical week. 
 
 
4.5. The Role of Regulation 
It is a more general finding in the literature (McCartney 2004)  and assumed in 
the OECD data, that quality of provision is directly linked to staffing. The two 
key indicators taken as proxy for quality in the OECD data are child staff 
ratios, and levels of training.  
Chart PF4.2A gives typical staff ratios across childcare or daycare services. 
This does not take account of the actual deployment of staff within services, 
but only gives overall figures. In the UK the ratios vary by age of child and 
must be adhered to at all times. Other countries may vary the ratio according 
to activities or circumstances; that is, ratios may be organised in such a way 
as to take account of meal and rest times, and may vary throughout the day. 
A number of countries do not admit children under one or two to nurseries, 
because maternal and paternal leave arrangements are generous, and there 
is no need for childcare provision. There is a relatively small difference 
between the ranking of the first 10 countries, which includes the UK, and 
which may be accounted for by flexible use of ratios and age of admission. 
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OECD Family Database PF4.2A  Child to Staff Ratios for 0-3 in formal 
daycare services.  
 
 
 
Chart PF4.2B gives child-staff ratios in preschools (i.e. in the education 
sector). Here the UK has a slightly lower ranking than other countries.  
 
OECD Family database PF4.2B  Child-to Staff Ratios in Pre-schools.  
 
 
 
The OECD comparative tables PF4.2A and PF4.2B also compare countries 
on qualifications of those who work in childcare and early education services. 
As typologies vary so much, these tables attempt to describe the qualificatory 
arrangements in each country rather than rank countries. They are self 
explanatory.  
Comparative data available on ratios, place of work, and the levels of 
qualifications of workers suggest that UK workers in childcare appear to be 
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less well qualified than workers in other countries, although those that work in 
schools providing nursery education tend to be better qualified.  
There is some evidence that providers would like to see higher standards. 
Brind et al (2012) report that in England most providers say that they would 
like to spend more on staff training. The Laing and Buisson report (2011) 
indicates that staff wages have not so far risen directly in relation to increased 
training requirements. The cost modelling put forward by Brewer (2009) 
discussed in section 2.6 suggests £2.6billion investment would be needed to 
lift staff qualifications. 
In other countries there are additional regulatory requirements, over and 
above those in the UK. In Nordic services, for example, financial 
accountability and transparency to parents are also part of the regulatory 
requirements (see Appendix 2 and Jacobsen and Vollset 2012). External 
space requirements, which are optional in the UK, are more stringently 
applied in some other countries (Penn 2012). 
Quality childcare is expensive, but there is little evidence that high fees are a 
function of regulatory requirements. However the converse is true – that very 
lax regulatory regimes lead to poor quality provision. This is illustrated in the 
case of the USA, where regulatory controls are described as weak, and the 
quality of provision is generally regarded as mediocre (NICDH 2007).The 
case study of the Netherlands (Appendix 1) indicates that when regulatory 
requirements were abolished for childcare services there was a measurable 
drop in quality. Regulatory controls have now been re-introduced. 
 
5. Government Expenditure on ECEC 
This section compares the rankings of the UK on comparative 
expenditure charts and considers how ranking impacts on uptake of 
services. 
5.1. UK ranking on OECD expenditure charts. 
The UK is consistently ranked as a high spender on ECEC, both in terms of 
absolute and per capita spending. As indicated in section 3, the UK databases 
are complex and may not be fully reflected in OECD rankings.  In addition the 
definitions of education and care vary across countries. 
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OECD Family database PF3.1A. Public expenditure on childcare and 
early education services, as % of GDP. 
 
 
The UK is ranked third in this table, and thus appears as a generous spender 
on ECEC services. In the next table, where the data is presented in terms of 
per capita, the UK is also presented as a high spender, although its ranking 
has slipped slightly. 
OECD Family database PF31B.  Public Expenditure on childcare and 
preschool per child.  
 
OECD family database PF3.1B gives per capita spending per child on 
childcare and early education. Again this table may indicate classificatory 
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problems, since it depends on what is counted as childcare and what is 
counted as education, in compiling the figures. Here the UK slips slightly 
down the ranks. 
5.2. Distributional Effects of ECEC expenditure 
Another way of considering government expenditure on early education and 
childcare is to consider who benefits from such expenditure in terms of uptake 
of services. The most recent OECD (Verbist et al 2012) and EU work 
(Atkinson and Marlier 2012) has drawn on household panel data to explore in 
more detail how public funding for ECEC services lessens the impact of 
poverty; and in particular how the poorest children in society benefit from 
ECEC provision.  
Verbist et al (2012) point out that ECEC provision has a number of 
complementary functions. Access to affordable childcare is one of the key 
elements of strategies to reconcile work and family life, promote equal 
opportunities and combat social exclusion (Matsaganis and Verbist 2009; 
NESSE/EU 2009, OECD 2011a) Investment in early education in particular 
can protect children from further social and educational disadvantages and 
contribute to more equality. Pre-primary education is crucial in this respect. 
(OECD, Family Database 2011). 
These overlaps between the traditional categories of childcare and education 
mean that it is problematic to compute the effects of financial interventions 
and to decide which beneficiaries are most relevant for the calculations, for 
instance children themselves or working mothers.  Calculation difficulties are 
exacerbated in those few countries, such as the UK, where figures on 
expenditure on childcare are not directly linked to uptake, and where 
information on uptake is obtained from survey data. 
 A detailed account of the basis on which figures on uptake are calculated is 
available in the full Verbist/OECD report. Comparative tables should therefore 
be treated with some care.  
A further report “Money and Kindergartens – What is the Optimal Mix” 
published by Forster and Verbist (2012). Based on earlier work, this is likely to 
suggest that ECEC spending is likely to achieve more equitable results when 
it is used directly for provision, rather than as a demand led subsidy to parents 
through the tax and benefit system.  
The same amount of government money spent on ECEC can have very 
different effects on poverty reduction. A detailed comparative study of ECEC 
in Sweden and Flanders using household level data suggested that, although 
overall per capita expenditure on ECEC in both countries was very similar, the 
results in terms of social equality and efficiency were very different, Sweden 
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having a much more equitable service (Lancker,W. and van Ghysels, J. 
2011).   
The table on income advantage from ECEC services to those families living 
below the poverty line is given in the table below. This is based on more 
recent data than some other OECD tables. This suggests that ECEC 
expenditure does not make a significant difference to the poorest families in 
the UK, a position confirmed in the review of the UK data in section 3.  
Income advantage from ECEC services below the poverty line. OECD 
Verbist et al.  
 
This data is also presented in terms of income quintiles. The table below 
illustrates that the lowest income quintile of the population is least likely to 
benefit from ECEC expenditure, in comparison with many other countries.  
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Actual ECEC beneficiaries as a share of potential beneficiaries by 
income quintile. OECD Verbist et al  
 
 
These tables suggest that the level of expenditure is not a guarantee that 
money will be spent efficiently. If one of the aims of ECEC expenditure is 
poverty reduction, sophisticated strategies need to be in place to ensure that it 
will benefit all children equally. This table very broadly suggests that those 
countries which have a strategy for directly funding services benefit lower 
income groups more than do those countries which rely on childcare markets 
and retrospective funding. One of these strategies may be to fund services 
directly and not retrospectively, as is currently the case in the UK.   
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6. Conclusions 
This review suggests that provision of early childhood education and care is a 
complex area and not easily comparable across OECD countries. The OECD 
database represents a general indication of comparative position, rather than 
any hard and fast ranking.  
In addition, the OECD stresses that ECEC cannot be isolated as a policy 
area, but is intimately connected with demographics, poverty levels, labour 
market policies and family well-being policies more generally, as well as with 
fiscal regimes. The figures presented here on ECEC offer a snapshot only 
and should not be used as any kind of definitive statement on UK policy.  
In section 2 of this report we have explored the limitations of the OECD 
statistical data. Firstly, the categorisations used are inevitably problematic. 
ECEC is a difficult field in which to produce comparisons because care and 
early education services are delivered in different ways and apply to different 
age groups across OECD countries. The OECD has made an attempt to 
define this range of services (see appendix 3) but individual country patterns 
of delivery may differ considerably.  
The data is compiled on a national level, even though there may be wide 
variation within countries; these variations cannot be reflected in the tables.  
The compilation dates of the data vary, and some of the data is over 10 years 
old. Like the UK, countries may, have revised their policies considerably since 
the data was initially collected. It is also not clear how the data was compiled, 
and what mechanisms were used within countries to provide the data. 
Nevertheless, in so far as it is possible, the statistical analysis of the data tries 
to compensate for these difficulties, and the tables offer the most rigorous 
comparative data currently available.    
In section 3 of the report we have explored how the UK figures have been 
compiled, and highlight some of the anomalies in producing national data on 
ECEC. Some of the research into UK data on ECEC is reviewed. Because tax 
and benefit support for childcare is retrospective in the UK, this presents 
some problems in calculating expenditure and uptake, given the constant 
changes in family circumstances whilst children are very young.  
Section 4 reproduces and explains OECD comparative data on childcare fees. 
The data provides a comparative picture of gross childcare fees at the point of 
use across OECD countries. The data is then recalculated to give net 
childcare costs modelled for families for net family income, 67% of average 
wage, and 167%, of average wage.  
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The data suggests that fees are very high in the UK in comparison with other 
countries, because many countries give direct subsidies to providers, which 
enables them to charge low fees at the point of use. The offsets through the 
tax and benefit system only marginally affect family expenditure on childcare, 
unlike other countries such as Australia and USA where fees are high at the 
point of use, but offsets are greater. Dual earner families earning 167% of the 
average wage may pay up to 43% of their income on childcare fees. However 
lone parent families who receive offsets are likely to have their childcare costs 
reduced to 14% of household income.2 In this section, we also look at other 
childcare support, such as employer support, and the provision of informal 
care. 
Data on staff: child ratios and qualifications is also considered in this section. 
We can find no evidence that the high costs of childcare in the UK occur 
because the UK is over-regulated. In comparison with other countries on 
these indicators the UK is not heavily regulated. Other EU evidence briefly 
considered in the report suggests that on other issues, such as financial 
regulation and accountability, the UK could be considered as lightly regulated. 
Section 5 considers government expenditure and explores how government 
expenditure has been targeted.  UK government expenditure is high, although 
it is not clear why this might be so (see section 3). It may in part relate to the 
categorisation of educational expenditure. However it also appears that 
despite considerable efforts by UK government, expenditure on ECEC 
reaches fewer of the poor than in some other OECD countries, and does not 
impact significantly on the poorest quintile of the population. This appears to 
be confirmed by UK research which suggests that uptake of ECEC provision 
is less likely amongst the poorest parents. 
   
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
                                                          
2
 See OECD Family Database Table PF3.4C, Panel B.  
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APPENDIX I 
 
PARENTAL CHILDCARE COSTS IN THE NETHERLANDS 
AFTER THE CHILDCARE ACT 2005 – A CASE STUDY 
 
Summary 
The Netherlands shares with England the unique distinction of having 
introduced legislation, the 2005 Childcare Act (Wet op de Kinderopvang 
2005), specifically aimed at encouraging the privatisation and marketisation of 
childcare. This formed part of a bid to promote maternal employment levels by 
reducing parental childcare costs. The adoption of a market approach was 
based on the view that this encouraged business efficiency and a better 
balance between supply and demand, while extending parental choice 
(Plantenga and Remery, 2009). This marketisation involved a substantial 
amount of deregulation. 
Recent research and official statistics confirmed expected as well as 
extensive unintended consequences of this marketisation process. There was 
an increase of around 10% in the use of formal childcare during the period 
2004-2008 (Berden and Kok, 2009). While the availability and uptake of 
formal provision increased, the improved childcare offer to parents could be 
shown to account for 26% of the increase in the amount of female labour 
market participation in the period 2005-2009, this appeared to have cost the 
Dutch government in total some 100 thousand euro (£83.310 at today’s rates) 
per additional job taken up out of a total of 30.000 (CPB, 2012). 
Four years after the Act’s introduction, the 40% increase in the uptake of 
childcare tax credits exceeded childcare budget predictions and an evaluation 
concluded that the marketisation process had largely failed (Berden et al, 
2009). The Dutch government proceeded to freeze childcare tax credit levels. 
By now these have been substantially reduced. In view of the evidence for 
deteriorating childcare quality, the Dutch government in 2012 also decided on 
the reversal of earlier deregulation decisions. Certain current childcare policy 
guidance is to be converted into a set of enforceable Regulations, with a view 
to protecting children’s well-being and longer-term outcomes (Minister van 
Sociale Zaken en Werkgelegenheid, 2012). 
Background 
About 6% of the Dutch population of just over 16 million inhabitants consists 
of children under five, while the total female employment rate is around 65%. 
While maternal employment rates are high, more Dutch mothers work part-
time than in any other OECD member state (Plantenga and Remery, 2009). 
Consequently Dutch children primarily attend childcare provision part-time, 
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especially children under 3. Dutch early education and childcare are provided 
and funded separately. Schools offer part-time publicly-funded nursery 
education to children from their fourth birthday, before they start compulsory 
schooling at five. Part-time playgroup places offer young children 
opportunities to socialise with peers and include subsidised places allocated 
by local authorities for children with additional needs or from disadvantaged 
backgrounds. Registered childcare in private for-profit and not-for-profit 
daycare centres or with childminders is used primarily by children under four, 
mostly part-time, while out-of-school care targets children aged 4 to 12 (Lloyd, 
2012, p 113). Informal care by family and friends has traditionally also played 
a significant part in Dutch parents’ childcare arrangements (Plantenga, 2002).  
Impact on childcare costs 
The 2005 Dutch Childcare Act radically changed the way this childcare 
system is funded. The Act introduced a demand-led childcare market as a 
substitute for the previous system of unsubsidised parental fees coupled with 
supply-side funding, which had been largely brokered by local authorities. 
Under the Act’s ‘tripartite’ method of funding childcare, costs are shared 
between central government, employers and parents. Via income-related 
childcare tax credits and employer childcare contributions, compulsory since 
2007, parental childcare costs were halved during the period up to 2009.  
At the time the 2005 Childcare Act was introduced, the government agreed 
with employer organisations and trade unions that, in 2008, up to 90% of all 
employees would be reimbursed by their employer for a third of childcare 
costs for children aged 0 to 12. The employer childcare levy was to be shared 
in the case of two employed parents. In practice, this meant that for each 
parent the respective employer levy would be for one sixth of the costs. 
However, when this target had not yet been reached in mid 2006, the 
Government proceeded to make this levy compulsory (Grünel, 2006).  
Although originally parents were expected to pay around a third of costs, in 
2010 parents on average paid 22% of their childcare costs which averaged 
1,600 euro annually, equivalent to around £1,333 at today’s rates. 
Households with a disposable income above 75 thousand euro (£62.480) 
contributed some 42% of the direct costs, but nevertheless received the 
average annual childcare tax credit allowance of 5,600 euro (£4,670) (CBS, 
April 2011). The government set upper limits on the hourly childcare costs 
funded under the tax credit system, but the upper income level qualifying 
parents for financial support was raised year on year. Employer contributions 
were paid direct to government and covered approximately 25% of parental 
tax credits. In all, the government contributes over half of parents’ direct 
childcare costs. 
Average childcare fee levels rose in line with levels of fiscal support: 70% of 
providers took this upper qualifying limit into account in setting their annual 
fees. Most enterprises agreed their fees, and indeed staff remuneration, with 
the settings’ parent committees, which had been required under the 2005 Act 
and predictably acted as a brake on raising profits (Berden et al, 2009). 
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Nevertheless, by 2007, average profit among day nurseries amounted to 
5.2% of turnover, as compared to 0.6% in 2005 (Waarborgfonds 
Kinderopvang, 2008).  
Impact on supply 
In their evaluation, Berden et al (2009) established that small private-for-profit 
childcare businesses needed to realise a profit of between 10 and 20% of 
turnover to remain sustainable, whereas larger not-for-profit chains needed to 
secure a surplus of between 2 and 4% for the same reason. Not-for-profit 
chains acknowledged that loss-making settings in poorer areas might be 
cross-subsidised by settings in more well-to-do areas which did manage to 
realise a surplus. After the Act’s introduction, numbers of formal childcare 
providers increased exponentially, while informal care uptake decreased. 
Much of this occurred via the provision of childminding by relatives.  
The number of registered childminders, including grandparents, increased by 
over 200% within four years. This issue was addressed by the Dutch 
Government by means of an amendment to the 2005 Childcare Act tightening 
up on childminding regulations (Ministerie van Onderwijs, Cultuur en 
Wetenschap, 2009). Subsequently, between 2009 and 2010 the number of 
parents in receipt of a childcare subsidy for childminding provision was 
reduced by 25% (CBS, April 2011). 
There was also a 16% increase in the number of full day care settings 
between late 2006 and late 2008. During the same period the largest increase 
in providers, 68%, was observed among businesses brokering childminding 
provision, agencies helping parents find a childminder (Paulussen-
Hoogeboom and Gemmeke, 2009). In England there are no agencies with an 
equivalent role 
As for places, by far the highest number of places for children aged under 4 
became available in the two major cities, The Hague and Amsterdam, mostly 
with for-profit providers, even though growth was more pronounced in areas 
which had lower numbers of places to start with (Paulussen-Hoogeboom and 
Gemmeke, 2009: p 9). Early impact research by Noailly and Visser (2009) 
suggested that the new funding system driving the childcare market had a 
noticeable impact on numbers of not-for-profit providers in non-urban areas, 
which substantially decreased. Previously these had offered subsidised 
childcare places allocated through the local authorities acting as 
intermediaries. Waiting lists for day nurseries remained static, though they 
decreased for out-of-school care. 
In another revolutionary development, childcare provision was largely 
deregulated as a result of the 2005 Childcare Act, though compliance with 
basic quality criteria was still required. This took the form of an annually 
renewable ‘covenant’ drawn up between three childcare sector stakeholder 
groups, specifying basic quality standards to be employed in local inspections, 
mostly concerned with health and safety issues (Convenant Kwaliteit 
Kinderopvang, 2006). There is no prescribed curriculum beyond a 
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‘pedagogical plan’ requirement. The effect of deregulation on competition 
between childcare providers was mainly seen in the area of day nursery group 
sizes which increased from an average of 9.7 to 10.9 and in some 
improvements to the nursery environment. 
Impact on quality 
The consequences of deregulation for operational aspects, such as the 
observed increase in group size, are thought to have had a very limited 
positive impact on quality (Berden et al, 2009). In contrast, it appears to have 
coincided with a continuous decrease in childcare quality over the last six to 
eight years (de Kruif et al, 2009). Summarising de Kruif et al’s research, Lloyd 
and Penn (2010, p 44/45) note that: 
 “Compared with a similar representative sample of childcare settings 
studied in 2005, a significant worsening of the quality of the physical 
environment as well as a much impaired sensitivity and responsiveness 
in staff/child interactions were evident among the sample studied in 
2008. Among provisional explanations identified by the research team 
were increased pressures on staff due to the industry’s rapid growth, an 
insufficient focus in childcare training on working with very young 
children, and the limited childcare setting choice open to parents.” 
The latest report of the Netherlands Childcare Research Consortium (NCKO, 
2011) notes that in the 2010 round which focused on 1 and 2 year olds, few 
new findings were added to those from the de Kruif et al’s (2009) study. In 
response to the biennial research reports published by this publicly funded 
research consortium, the Dutch government in 2011 reversed some of the 
Act’s provisions regarding quality control. Centralising this aspect of 
regulation, it introduced national policy guidance concerning maximum group 
sizes and staff child ratios for day nurseries and playgroups (Minister van 
Sociale Zaken en Werkgelegenheid, 2011). 
Only a year later, in February 2012, the Dutch government has taken a further 
step towards the reversal of the childcare quality deregulation introduced 
under the Childcare Act 2012. Having received legal advice that policy 
guidance does not allow the enforcement of sanctions in cases where 
childcare businesses act contrary to such provisions and thereby put 
children’s well-being and healthy development at risk, the Secretary of State 
announced the introduction of yet another amendment. Childcare quality 
Guidance to the Act will be converted into enforceable Regulations as early as 
spring 2012. 
Impact on government finances 
Within four years of the Childcare Act’s introduction the 40% increase in the 
uptake of childcare credits had exceeded the government’s estimates, largely 
as a result of the 200% increase in the number of registered childminders. By 
2010 the Childcare Act had been amended to include new regulations 
concerning the reimbursement of parental childminding costs via the childcare 
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tax credit system. These were coupled with some new quality criteria for 
childminders and childminding brokerage agencies (Ministerie van Onderwijs, 
Cultuur en Wetenschap, 2009).  
As a result about a quarter fewer parents received a childcare allowance to 
use registered childminders than had been the case during 2009. However, 
the level of credits for centre-based and out-of-school provision remained 
similar (Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek, April 2011). 
Nevertheless, out of the total body of allowances paid by the Dutch 
government in 2010 for childcare, health care, rent support and the child tax 
credit, 37% was still spent on childcare support (Centraal Bureau voor de 
Statistiek, December 2011). 
In the last two years the Dutch Government has taken stringent measures to 
reduce the cost to the Excequer of childcare support. In 2011 parents 
received 25% less in childcare tax credits than the previous year (Ministerie 
van Sociale Zaken en Werkgelegenheid, 2011). Since 1 January 2012, 
childcare tax credit support to dual earner families is based on the number of 
hours worked by the parent working the fewest hours per week. The employer 
contribution will similarly be recalculated with respect to this percentage 
(Rijksoverheid, 2012). 
Conclusion 
By 2009 childcare related costs to the Dutch exchequer had risen by 3 billion 
euro since 2005, when the Childcare Act was implemented with the express 
intention of promoting childcare market operations (CPB, 2012). In an 
interesting development, by 2011 the childcare policy remit, which had been 
relocated to the Department for Education following the Act, had reverted to 
being the responsibility of the Department of Social Affairs and Employment. 
Nevertheless it was not so much a rise in childcare cost per se that forced the 
Dutch government into the policy reversal described here. This was primarily 
due to the unintended costs to the exchequer of the larger than expected 
uptake of tax credits for formal childcare and the conversion of informal to 
formal provision, notably through the expansion of childminding.   
The tripartite funding system introduced in 2005 turned out to contain many 
loopholes which are gradually being closed. A more careful modelling of 
possible unintended fiscal consequences might have prevented such 
developments. 
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APPENDIX 2: CASE STUDY OF ECEC COMPARATIVE COSTS 
AND FEES, NORWAY. 
 
The following information on Norway is drawn from Jacobsen and Vollset 
(2012- see refs).  The authors describe how providers are funded, and what 
obligations they must meet as a condition of funding.   
The legislation 
 ‘Kindergarten’ (in Norwegian barnehage) is the common term for different 
types of early childhood education and care institutions. The Norwegian 
Kindergarten Act (Act no 64 of 17 June 2005) with later amendments, is used 
to cover the age group 0 – 5 years, (compulsory school age is six). As paid 
parental leave is about one year, there is little need for care for children under 
the age of one. Since 2009 children from the age of approximately one year 
have a legal right to a place.  
Kindergartens might offer full time or part time services. In addition there are 
so-called ‘family kindergartens’ with small groups of children cared for by 
assistants with teaching guidance from an educated preschool teacher or 
‘open kindergartens’ where the children attend together with one of their 
parents (or another person) who takes care of them, under the leadership of 
an educated preschool teacher. Kindergartens might be non-municipal or 
state owned and run.  
In the Kindergarten Act (2005) the Norwegian Storting (Parliament) 
established the current regulatory framework governing the kindergarten 
sector. The act has sections concerning the purpose of kindergartens, and on 
the content of what is offered to children; on parents’ and children’s rights to 
participation; on approval of and supervision of kindergartens by the local 
authorities; and on staff competencies.  
The rationale of the Kindergarten Act, in force August 2010, and the curricular 
framework incorporate the social and educational mandate of kindergartens. 
The rationale is as follows: 
 
The kindergarten shall, in collaboration and close understanding with the 
home, safeguard the children’s need for care and play, and promote 
learning and training as a basis for an all-round development. The 
Kindergarten shall be based on fundamental values in the Christian and 
humanist heritage and  tradition, such as respect for human dignity and 
nature, on intellectual freedom, charity, forgiveness, equality and 
solidarity, values that also appear in different religions and beliefs and are 
rooted in human rights. 
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The children shall be able to develop their creative zest, sense of wonder 
and need to investigate. They shall learn to take care of themselves, each 
other and nature. The children shall develop basic knowledge and skills. 
They shall have the right to participate in accordance with their age and 
abilities.  
  
The kindergartens shall meet the children with trust and respect, and 
acknowledge the intrinsic value of childhood. They shall contribute to well-
being and joy in play and learning, and shall be a challenging and safe 
place for community life and friendship. The Kindergarten shall promote 
democracy and equality and counteract all forms of discrimination. 
 
If a service operates on a regular basis and one or more children spend more 
than 20 hours per week, and the number of children present at the same time 
is ten or more when the children are three years or over or five or more when 
the children are less than three years, and the activity is carried out in return 
for remuneration, the service is obliged to seek approval as kindergarten and 
obey the Kindergarten Act and regulations given in accordance with the 
legislation. The Kindergarten Act requires head teachers and pedagogical 
leaders, of groups, to be educated preschool teachers to the level of a three 
year higher education with bachelor degree at universities or university 
colleges or equivalent.  According to the regulations there must be one 
educated pre-school teacher per 7 – 9 children under the age of three and per 
14 – 18 children over the age of three. In family kindergartens there must be 
one educated preschool teacher per 30 children. Approximately 1/3 of the 
staff are educated preschool teachers, the rest are assistants and child and 
youth workers. 
Types of Providers and Funding Mechanisms 
More than 50% of childcare provision in Norway is provided in the private and 
voluntary sector. By the end of 2009 there were 6 675 kindergartens in 
Norway, 3,096 public kindergartens and 3,579 private. At the same time there 
were 270,174 children in kindergartens; about 80,000 more than in 2000. A 
total of 88 per cent of all children between one and five years had a place in a 
kindergarten. For children aged 1-2 years, about 77 per cent attended 
kindergarten 
The municipalities, however small, play an important role in the kindergarten 
sector. They govern all kindergartens, both municipal and non-municipal. 
Owners of kindergartens must apply to the local authority for approving their 
service in accordance with current rules, and are obliged to run their service in 
accordance with current statutes and rules. The municipalities must 
monitor/supervise the kindergartens situated in the municipality. Further, they 
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are responsible for meeting the need for kindergarten services demanded by 
their inhabitants and for fulfilling the children’s legal right to a place in 
kindergarten. The municipalities must, from 2011, administer the block grants 
from the state for kindergartens, both the municipal and the non-municipal 
ones.  
 
The owners of the kindergartens are by law obliged to state the operating 
conditions of their kindergartens. Admission criteria should be part of the 
conditions. Further all approved kindergartens in the municipality are required 
to cooperate on the admission of children. The municipality must facilitate a 
coordinated admission process, taking account of the diversity and distinctive 
character of the kindergartens. Great importance is attached to the wishes 
and needs of users in connection with the actual admission. The coordinated 
admission process is intended to ensure equal treatment of children and 
equal treatment of municipal and privately owned kindergartens. Since spring 
2009 the municipalities are obliged by law to offer all children a place in 
kindergarten, municipal or private, if they turn one year of age before 
September and their parents apply for a place in the spring admission 
procedure, which is a once a year procedure.  
From the outset, it was recognised that a system where the majority of the 
costs were to be borne by the central State budget had to take into account 
the substantial cost differences relating to kindergartens in the different 
municipalities. Furthermore it became clear in the legislative procedure that 
the municipalities had higher costs than the non-municipal kindergartens. In 
2003, the costs per child per hour of the non-municipal kindergartens were on 
average 85% of the costs of the municipal kindergartens. Non-municipal 
kindergartens were given a legal right to grants from the municipalities 
through the adoption of the Regulation No. 539 of 19 March 2004 on 
equivalent treatment of kindergartens with regard to public subsidies.  
A maximum price ceiling on parental fees was introduced, both in municipal 
and non-municipal kindergartens, to cap parents’ fees at 20% of the costs of 
the services. Non-municipal kindergartens cannot charge parental fees at 
their own discretion. As of 1 January 2006, the applicable rate was fixed at 
NOK 2,250 per month. The parents’ fees in 2011 are NOK 2,330 
(approximately GBP 260) per month and NOK 25,630 (approximately GBP 
2830) per year. Parents with more than one child benefit from a fee reduction 
of minimum 30% for the second child and minimum 50% for the third or 
following children. There are free places for children from low-income families.  
There is a large variety of kindergarten owners, but there are more similarities 
between their services than differences, because of tight legislation. The 
Kindergarten Act does not legislate for ownership. The different owners may 
organise their ownerships in different ways. The following tables show the 
total of kindergartens and children in 2003 and 2008 and the percentage of 
different private ownerships: 
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Table 1: Kindergartens and children in kindergartens 2003 and 2008 by public 
or private ownership (Source: Statistics Norway) 
 
     Kindergartens   Children 
     2003  2008  2003 
 2008 
 
Total     5924  6705  205 172
 261 886 
   
Public     52.5%  46%   57.8%  54% 
Private     47.5%  54%   42.2%  46%
     
 
 
Table 2: Private ownership – kindergartens 2003 and 2008 and children 2008, 
percent (Source: Statistics Norway) 
 
     Kindergartens Kindergartens Children 
     2003   2008  
 2008 
 
Total     3013   3623  
 120 384 
Owned by  
Congregations       9.5     7.1        
6.4 
Parents     29.2    21.9      
27.9 
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Associations of      2.5     1.3        
1.0 
housewives, social 
welfare etc. 
Enterprises      7.2    15.1       
21.2 
Pedagogical/ideo-     2.8      3.5         
4.2 
logical organizations 
Single persons    34.5   34.0       
16.8 
Others     14.3   17.1       
22.6 
 
 
There has also been a clear change towards non-municipal establishments 
rather than municipal enterprises. The increase in public support the later 
years has made it more ‘interesting’ or economically profitable for non-
municipal enterprises to establish kindergartens.  
Examples of private kindergarten owners 
An example of a non-profit private kindergarten owner is the Kanvas 
Foundation. Kanvas was established as a membership organisation in 1986, 
named Barnehageforbundet (Union of Kindergartens) by initiative of parents. 
In 1992 it was converted into a non-profit foundation. All profits are reserved 
for the benefit of their purpose: Kindergartens. All funds of Kanvas are 
reserved to strengthening the competence of their employees, to continuously 
improve their institutions and to develop and build new kindergartens.  
Since the conversion into a non-profit foundation in 1992 Kanvas has focused 
on building, owning and operating kindergartens in Norway. Kanvas has a 
central administration in Oslo offering financial, administrative and educational 
services. The administration provides service, support and advises to the 
employees of their kindergartens, enabling them to satisfy the needs and 
expectations of their customers. Kanvas currently runs about 55 kindergartens 
in ten different municipalities across southern Norway. They employ more 
than 900 professionals taking care of approximately 3000 children  
Trygge Barnehager AS (Safe Kindergartens, a joint stock company) was 
established in 1987. According to their website they have established about 
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380 kindergartens all over the country. Most of the kindergartens they have 
established are organised as parental cooperatives, but they have also 
established kindergartens for foundations, associations, enterprises, private 
persons and municipalities. In the later years they have as well established 
and run their own kindergartens through their running company FUS as (joint 
stock companies). Today there are about 125 FUS-kindergartens. The FUS-
kindergartens are organised as independent companies, with a great freedom 
to make their own running concepts. The kindergartens have non-economic 
goals, and if there is an economic surplus, and the surplus of the operation 
remains in the kindergarten, it might be used to improve quality or as an 
economic reserve.  
Norway’s oldest and largest chain of private family kindergartens Nötteliten og 
Hakkebakkeskogen familiebarnehage was established in Oslo in 1996. They 
have 31 family kindergarten units in private homes, where they rent the 
ground or first floor to use as family kindergarten. They have eight or nine 
children under the age of three in each department together with two 
assistants, and a staff of 10 educated preschool teachers to supervise each 
group once a week. These family kindergartens are owned and run as an 
undertaking owned by one person. The greatest difference between these 
family kindergartens and ordinary kindergartens for this age group is that 
there is no preschool teacher available in the groups on a daily basis (see 
website). This way of running kindergartens is less expensive than if there 
were preschool teachers available daily.  
The provision of kindergarten services in Norway has never been a typical 
economic activity. The kindergarten sector has for several decades been 
defined as part of the public sector, even if not directly provided by them, and 
has been financially dependent upon the municipal and public authorities, with 
state fixing parents’ fees from 2004.  
Norway’s expenditure on ECEC as a percentage of GDP is slightly less than 
that of the UK, but on the indicators listed in the tables given in this report, 
Norway’s performance is considerably better than that of the UK 
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